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Abstract  
Historians of Christian European diplomacy have tended to approach Ottoman 
diplomatic practice from a rather Eurocentric perspective in that they presuppose 
initial Ottoman non-involvement in the development of the modern diplomatic 
system followed by a reluctant adoption of it when faced with a period of economic, 
military and political decline. In this article I read two fethnames [victory missives] 
sent to the Queen of England, Elizabeth I to celebrate the Ottoman capture of 
Nagykanizsa (Kanije) castle in 1600 as a means by which the Ottoman state both 
performed and legitimized Ottoman sovereignty, yet also provided an opportunity for 
political or diplomatic negotiation.  
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Within the courtyard were the Turk’s dwarfs and dumbmen […] the 
Grand Seignior, who sat on a Chair of State, appareled in a gown of 
cloth of silver. The floor under his feet […] was covered with a 
carpet of green satin, embroidered with silver, orient pearls, and 
great turquoises. […] None were in the room with him, but a Pasha 
who stood next to the wall over against him, hanging down his head, 
and looking submissively upon the ground, as all his subjects do in 
his presence. The Ambassador thus, betwixt 2 who stood at the door, 
being led in, either of them taking an arm, kissed his hand; and so 
backward, with his face to the Turk, they brought him near unto the 
door again; where he stood until they had likewise done with all his 
Gentlemen. Which ended, the Ambassador, according as is the 
custom when any Present is delivered, made his 3 demands, such as 
he thought most expedient for Her Majesty’s honour, and the 
peaceable trade of our nation into his dominions. Hereupon he 
answered, in one word: Nolo; which is; in Turkish, as much as It 
shall be done! For it is not the manner of the Turkish Emperor 
familiarly to confer with any Christian Ambassador, but he appoints 
his Vizier, in his person, to grant their demands if they are to his 
liking.
1
 
 
Continuous diplomacy, invented in Renaissance Italy to gratify the 
demands of the city-state system […] was diffused in the sixteenth 
century through central and western Europe where the emerging 
nation-states were forging a continent-wide state system. […] The 
Ottoman Empire was the first non-Christian country to participate in 
                                                 
1
 Richard Wragge, A description of a voyage to Constantinople and Syria, from Richard Hakluyt, The 
principall Navigations, Voyages, traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, 1598, vol.2 303-7 
reprinted in Early Modern Tales of Orient: a critical anthology, ed. Kenneth Parker (London, 1999), 
54-60; 57. 
the European state system and the first unconditionally to accept its 
form of diplomacy.
2
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The two quotations at the beginning of this article exemplify a dominant scholarly 
perception of early modern Ottoman diplomatic practice among non-Ottoman 
specialists. The former presents an image of Ottoman disinterested arrogance and 
their preference for dramatic ceremonial performances designed more for affect than 
serious negotiation. While the latter, illustrating a far broader Eurocentric approach 
to Ottoman history, presupposes both an initial non-involvement by the Ottomans in 
the development of the modern diplomatic system and then their eventual passive 
adoption of it. Until recently, scholarship on early modern diplomacy, particularly 
the development of modern ‘western’ diplomatic practices and concepts, has 
generally situated it in the context of internal interrelations between fifteenth-century 
Italian states, before its export to other European powers, most notably the French, 
English and Spanish.
3
 The possibility that the Ottomans may have played a 
substantive role in the development of ‘this new style of diplomacy’ has generally 
been ignored.
4
 Although Goffman, nearly a decade ago, argued that the system of 
diplomacy that is often solely associated with the ‘west’ (including permanent 
embassies, the ideas of reciprocity and extra-territoriality, and the gathering of 
intelligence) had its antecedents, if not precedents, in Ottoman interaction with, and 
accommodation of, foreigners and their settlements in the Ottoman Empire, as van 
Gelder and Krstić note his work has not really led (until now) to a more sustained 
challenge to the notion of a unilateral western European origin of ‘modern’ 
diplomatic practices.
5
   
Indeed it has often been surmised that the Ottomans saw no real reason to 
engage with ‘western’ diplomatic practices including participation in multilateral 
conferences, the development of a professionally trained diplomatic corps, adherence 
to the principle of reciprocity, the establishment of permanent embassies and the 
recognition of the equality of sovereignties.
6
 Naff has argued that the Ottomans were 
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not interested in concluding reciprocal treaties and agreements, preferring instead to 
issue unilateral “pronouncements of their will”.7 Yet Goffman provides a number of 
antecedents of reciprocity in an Ottoman context including their insistence on 
entering reciprocal rights for their merchants into capitulary agreements signed 
between European states and the Ottoman Empire which in principle allowed for the 
settlement of Ottoman subjects in the principle European cities.
8
 De Groot too argues 
that Ottoman foreign commercial and political relations were conducted on the basis 
of reciprocity and bilaterialism, while Panaite and Skilliter discuss and provide 
translations of both Ottoman unilateral and bilateral or reciprocal ‘ahdnâme-i 
hümâyûn - the name used by the Ottoman chancery to describe all agreements by 
which the Ottoman state regulated international trade, alliances and relations as well 
as the status of foreigners in the empire.
9
  
In a similar manner it has often been repeated that although the Ottomans 
condescendingly received Christian European ambassadors at the Sublime Porte, 
they chose not to establish their own permanent resident embassies in European 
cities until the end of the eighteenth century when, it has been argued, they were 
forced to do so because of the decline of their empire.
10
 The rationale behind this 
asymmetrical diplomacy and the failure of the Ottomans to more quickly 
‘Europeanise’ their diplomatic practices has been explained by non-Ottoman 
specialists as a result of a number of factors. Primarily it has been argued that the 
Ottomans were not really interested in diplomatic, or any other form of, interaction 
with western European states as a result of a misguided religious and cultural 
chauvinism, combined with a prejudice against, and contempt for all things Christian 
and European.
11
 Anderson for example, has asserted that “the weight of Islamic 
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in the interests of western European states, in effect they did not want permanent Ottoman embassies in 
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European states see Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy,” 145; Naff, “Reform,” 295-6; Bernard Lewis, The 
Middle East and the West (London, 1964), 30 and 32.  For the claim that the Ottomans were “self-
religious conservatism” precluded the possibility of any developed diplomatic 
practice by the Ottomans.
12
 In religio-legal terms a number of scholars have 
suggested that as a result of Islamic political theory dividing the world into the dār 
al-Islām [abode of Islam] and the dār al-Harb [abode of war] there was, from the 
perspective of Islamic political entities, no need theoretically for diplomacy between 
states.
13
 Yet Ottoman scholars, including Goffman and Imber have stressed the 
flexible system of jurisprudence and latitudinarian politico-administrative structure 
that the Ottomans evolved through a practice of cultural syncretism and the 
pragmatic and creative combination and systemization of Islamic law, customary 
practices and sultanic decree.
14
 In particular, Gürkhan has stressed the need to 
evaluate Ottoman diplomacy through an analysis of vernacular diplomatic practices 
rather than the rigid theoretical framework prescribed by Islamic law.
15
 Other 
Eurocentric explanations have emphasized Ottoman military dominance up until the 
end of the sixteenth century as obviating any real need for diplomatic activities or 
stressed the Ottoman state’s desire to utilize non-reciprocity as a means of projecting 
their military and political superiority.
16
 Lastly, some scholars have connected a 
supposed lack of interest in commercial activities by the Ottoman state with their 
absence from the western European diplomatic system, arguing that it was primarily 
economic factors that motivated many European embassies to Istanbul.
17 
 
Notwithstanding the counter-arguments briefly outlined above, we should, as 
Constantinou has perceptively noted, be wary of normalizing western European 
diplomatic praxis as universal, or the embodiment of the essential principles of 
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diplomatic engagement, and then using it as the benchmark with which to measure 
and assess the level of ‘modernization’ or development of other states and cultures.18 
Mattingly’s emphasis on courtly diplomatic engagement by a professional 
ambassadorial elite as an archetype, a predominantly legalistic understanding of the 
practice of diplomacy, and a focus on particular types of documents has led to other 
instances of cross-confessional mediation being disregarded and thus the Ottoman 
contribution to the development of ‘modern’ diplomatic praxis being overlooked.19 
Universalizing local western European practices leads to an orientalising of Ottoman 
diplomatic praxis and its positioning as a Eurocentric counterpoint to western 
European policies and conduct – something exacerbated by situating the explanatory 
force of Ottoman actions in a combination of un-modern, imperial arrogance and an 
inward-looking, ‘medieval’ Islam.20 It is such an orientalising tendency that explains 
why, as in the quotation at the beginning of this article, the ceremonial presentation 
of foreign ambassadors, their arms pinned to their sides, before a supercilious, 
impassive, disdainful sultan has been frequently used as a synecdoche for all 
Ottoman diplomatic engagements with Europeans.
21
 However, Talbot’s distinction 
between foreign policy as an articulation of a state’s relationship with other states, 
and diplomacy as a practice of negotiation between individuals, groups and political 
entities on matters of mutual interest could be helpful in this context.
22
 Rather than 
examine Ottoman texts for evidence of how they conform to European diplomatic 
practices we should instead inquire about the extent to which Ottoman diplomatic 
practices achieved the aforementioned goals. Did they facilitate the conclusion of 
commercial, political and military alliances or agreements, resolve conflict, help 
acquire strategically important information and promote the interests and reputation 
of the state? In doing so, it might then be demonstrated that the origins of the new 
diplomatic practice were not to be located solely in western European culture, but 
arose from a process of diplomatic interaction in which Constantinople was just as an 
important a location as Venice.
23
 
In this article I will read two fethnames [victory missives] sent to the Queen 
of England, Elizabeth I to celebrate the Ottoman capture of Nagykanizsa castle in 
1600 as a means by which the Ottoman state both performed and legitimized its 
sovereignty and power, yet also provided an opportunity for political or diplomatic 
negotiation. In particular, I will draw attention to how the roles of the sultan and the 
grand vizier were instrumental in conveying, in this context, two distinct diplomatic 
functions, arguing that while the role of the sultan in this context was primarily, 
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although not exclusively, to assert the power and majesty of the empire, the role of 
the grand vizier was more mediatory and provided an opportunity for relatively 
informal communication. Through a nuanced reading of a fethname as an instance of 
cross-confessional, non-ambassadorial, diplomatic mediation, rather than as a 
performance of imperial propagandistic bombast, I provide an insight into 
multilayered Ottoman diplomatic practices and in doing so broaden our 
understanding of Ottoman diplomatic agency and contribute to challenging the 
Eurocentric notion that the Ottomans remained isolated from the development of 
early modern diplomacy.
24
 
 
The Nagykanizsa Fethnames 
 
Nagykanizsa Castle, located just south of Lake Balaton in today’s Hungary was 
captured from the Habsburgs by the Ottoman army under the personal command of 
the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha after a three-month siege in 1600. The castle had 
previously been deemed impregnable due to its location on an island in the middle of 
the river Berk surrounded by swamp: “it was neither possible to approach near by 
with trenches, nor was it possible to mine and whatever kind of cannon was fired 
would sink”.25 Thus its capture, together with that of Eger Castle in 1596, represented 
one of the most significant military victories by the Ottomans against the Habsburgs 
during the Long War (1593-1606). A fact attested to by the jubilant narration of the 
siege by a number of Ottoman historians, the dispatch of celebratory fethnames 
[victory missives] to “all sides and borders and to the possessors of provinces and 
governments” and the appointment of the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha to the position 
for life.
26
  Although a new administrative Ottoman province (eyalet-i Kanije) was 
established and despite the propagandistic potential, the capture of the castle did not 
drastically affect the Ottoman-Habsburg frontier which was essentially stabilized by 
the treaty of Zsitvatorok that concluded the war in 1606. 
Between 26
 
January and 4 February 1601 CE., approximately three months 
after the Ottoman capture of Nagykanizsa castle from the Habsburgs, two fethnames  
were sent simultaneously to Queen Elizabeth I in the name of the Ottoman sultan  and 
grand vizier.
27
 They both bear the same date and place of composition and were 
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 According to Mordtmann, I. H. and V. L. Ménage “Hasan Beyzade” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
vol. 3. ed. by Peri J. Bearman, et al. (Leiden 1960-2000 2
nd
 ed.) 248-9 there are five extant Nagykanisa 
fethnames written by Hasan Beyzade. Three of these are described as being in a mecmu’a 
written in Ottoman Turkish by Ottoman historian and administrator Hasan Beyzade.
28
 
There exist no contemporaneous English translations of these two documents 
although there is a French translation of the fethname sent in the name of the grand 
vizier listed in the Calendar of State Paper in the National Archives.
29
 This was not 
the first news that the English had received of the Ottoman victory. Their ambassador 
Henry Lello mentioned the capture of the castle in a letter sent from Constantinople 
dated 30 November 1600.
30
 Two fethnames celebrating the same victory were also 
sent to the Doge of Venice, but unfortunately these have not been able to be located in 
the Venetian archives since the beginning of the 1950s.
31
 Extant Ottoman-language 
fethnames that were actually sent to foreign rulers are not numerous. To date I have 
identified three in the National Archives in London and Pedani has documented six 
extant copies of Ottoman-language fethnames and two in Greek which were sent to 
the Doge, as well as Italian translations of seven others in the Venetian State 
Archives.
32
  
As noted in the text of the two extant English fethnames, they were delivered, 
and presumably translated and interpreted, by the Ottoman envoy and physician 
Barthélemy de Cœur. 33  Albert Lefaivre notes that Barthélemy de Cœur was a 
                                                                                                                                           
[compendium of writings] previously in the possession of Cavid Baysun, but I have been unable to 
locate them. The other two are those described here. 
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31
 Summaries of the two Venetian fethnames exist in Lajos Fekete, “A velencei állami levéltár magyar 
vonatkozású fethnāméi.” in Levéltari közlemények,  ed. Lajos Fekete (Mar-Dec. 1926), 139-157, 154-
7. M.P. Pedani, “Ottoman Fetihnames. The Imperial Letters Announcing a Victory,” Tarih 
incelemeleri dergisi 13 (1998): 181-192, 185 also references them. Fekete provides a summary in 
Hungarian of the Sultanic fethname and from a brief consideration of an Italian translation of Fekete’s 
summary, kindly provided by Dr Pedani, the fethname presented to the Doge seems remarkably similar 
to that given to Queen Elizabeth and it might not therefore be unreasonable to assume that the two 
fethnames were sent to Venice for the same reason as two were sent to England.  I thank Dr Pedani for 
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 All were sent to Queen Elizabeth I. Two are the Nagykanizsa fethnames discussed here, the other 
celebrates the capture of Eger castle, London: The National Archives, SP 102/4 11. Maria Pia Pedani, 
“Ottoman Fetihnames. The Imperial Letters Announcing a Victory,” Tarih incelemeleri dergisi [Ege 
Üniversitesi-Izmir] 13 (1998), 181-192. Of the Ottoman language fethnames, one celebrates the capture 
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 NA SP 102/4 21 lines: 38 and 39. 
‘renegade’ Frenchman and that he was sent by the sultan to the French King in March 
1601 to protest about the Duke of Mercoeur commanding the Habsburg army against 
the Ottomans.
34
 A letter from the English ambassador Lello dated January 1601 notes 
the dispatch by the Ottomans of a doctor to Venice and France.
35
 It is reasonable to 
speculate that de Cœur also delivered the Nagykanizsa fethnames to the Doge of 
Venice and that perhaps it is possible that similar fethnames were also sent to the 
French King.
36
 Barthélemy de Cœur provides an excellent example of what Rothman 
has termed a trans-imperial subject and Gürkhan discusses the role such subjects 
played as informal diplomatic actors.
37
  
Fethnames are relatively short, highly stylized, official documents that were 
sent to Ottoman governors, vassals and foreign rulers to celebrate Ottoman 
conquests.
38
 They were also read aloud in public spaces in Ottoman towns and cities, 
and included in Ottoman histories and collections of inşa [cultural writings]. 39 
However, such fethnames have rarely been the subject of academic inquiry. Despite 
being official state documents, and in the case of the Nagykanizsa fethnames being 
composed and written by a respected Ottoman historian-administrator who was an 
eyewitness to events, scholars of Ottoman history have tended to perceive fethnames 
as less than reliable historical sources because their “literary and/or religious-political 
character” tends “to blur or distort the facts”; they are not considered to be “impartial 
factual accounts”, but are seen as “halfway between political propaganda and heroic 
saga.”40 When they have been used as sources it has largely been for the documentary 
evidence they can provide of various battles: who did what to whom and when. With 
the exception of a single article by Stein there has been no study of the diplomatic 
functions that fethnames may have had.
41
 Moreover, in the context of the 
                                                 
34
 Albert Lefaivre Les Magyars pendant la domination ottomane en Hongrie: 1526-1722 vol.1 (Paris: 
1902) 255 and n.2 
35
 NA SP 97/4 fols 154-155b for reference see 155a. The doctor is referred to as “d. hert” an Anglicised 
version of de Coeur perhaps? 
36
 My preliminary enquiries have not found any references to such documents in the French archives. 
37
 Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul, (Ithaca, 
2012); Gürkhan, “Mediating Boundaries”. 
38
 The term fethname was, and still is, commonly used to describe two different genres or categories of 
written text. The first describes literary works, which celebrate Ottoman victories in general terms and 
were often written many years after the events they describe, whereas the second describes the more 
official victory letters described above. A.S. Levend, Gazavat-nameler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey’in 
Gazavat-namesi (Ankara, 1956) provides a list of many extant fethnames of both genres although as I 
note above there are very few extant fethnames that were actually dispatched to foreign rulers.   
39
 The first few lines of the Eger fethname inscribed in Mustafa Efendi Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki, ed. 
M. İpşirli, vol. 2, (Istanbul, 1989), 643-648, 643-644, and the version of the Eger fethname in the inşa 
collection in Berlin: Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, ms.or.fol.3332 fols 187b-189a, fol. 
187b, iterate the Sultan’s command to ensure the document is read aloud and news of the victory made 
public. See also Suraiya Faroqhi, “Ottoman Victory Celebrations,” unpublished manuscript. I thank the 
author for kindly sending me a copy of this article. 
40
 Christine Woodhead, “Ottoman Historiography on the Hungarian Campaigns: 1596 the Eger 
fethnamesi,” in Proceedings of the VIIIth Conference of the Comité des Études Ottomanes et Pré-
Ottomanes (CIÉPO), at Pécs, Hungary, 1986 (Ankara, 1994), 469-77, 469; Jan Schmidt, “The Egri-
Campaign of 1596,” 129; Bernard Lewis, Istanbul and the Civilisation of the Ottoman Empire 
(Oklahoma, 1963), 166. 
41
 Stein, “A Letter to Queen Elizabeth I,” analyses the grand vizierial fethname in terms of its potential 
diplomatic function, arguing that it is “an instrument in the Ottoman effort to establish a friendship of 
alliance with England” and was “principally […] intended to serve the ends of Ottoman diplomacy” 
234, but he does not consider it to be an example of a fethname and instead categorises it as a letter. 
G.L. Lewis “The Utility of Ottoman Fethnames” in Historians of the Middle East, eds. B. Lewis and 
P.M. Holt (London, 1962) 192-196, 196 argues that although one could not seek in fethnames 
Nagykanizsa fethname scholars have not asked why two, virtually identical missives 
were dispatched to celebrate the successful Ottoman capture of the castle, nor what 
explains the few textual differences between the two documents. Indeed, in general, 
little, if any attention has been paid to why fethnames are reinscribed in different 
textual contexts. Variations are invariably glossed over and once an ur-text has been 
decided upon other recessions are effectively ignored.
42
   
Rather than read the Nagykanizsa fethnames sent to Queen Elizabeth I simply 
for documentary evidence about the siege and gloss over the fact that two were sent, I 
focus on how the framing of the fethnames, the textual variations, reception context, 
and the expectations of the intended audience indicate that the texts were intended to 
be read in different ways and served distinct politico-diplomatic functions. The 
dispatch of two fethnames was a deliberate undertaking and although the actual 
audience of both documents was physically identical, the implied audience was 
different: it was assumed that Queen Elizabeth I would read the fethnames with two 
different sets of expectations as regards their function and meanings. While the 
sultanic fethname was intended to be read as an ‘iconograph of power’ within a 
discourse of imperial sovereignty and imagined its audience as a sovereign leader, the 
grand vizierial fethname was intended to be read within a discourse of diplomatic 
correspondence and was addressed to an implied audience perceived in more friendly 
terms, as a peer, someone with whom one could negotiate on matters of mutual 
interest.
43
 
My approach in this regard is indebted to the work of Suraiya Faroqhi who has 
noted that sultanic rescripts in the Venetian archives are often accompanied by letters 
written in the name of the grand vizier. While the sultanic rescripts are designed to 
instill awe in the recipient and to issue commands, the grand vizierial correspondence 
is more conciliatory, diplomatic and pragmatic. She argues that these grand vizierial 
letters played a role in informal inter-governmental negotiations and can therefore 
provide an insight into the bargaining process that existed between states.
44
 I argue 
that the Ottomans intended something similar with the unique dispatch of two 
fethnames celebrating the capture of Nagykanizsa castle.  
 
The Nagykanizsa sultanic fethname is an impressive document, a ritual 
performance of Ottoman power designed to intimidate and instill awe in equal 
measure. It was intended to be read within a discourse of imperial sovereignty, an 
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assumption reinforced by the ‘codicological aesthetics’ of the text.45  It is a three-foot 
long scroll embossed with gold with an ornate tuğra (stylized signature of the sultan) 
that would have been wrapped in silk and placed in a satin purse. The physicality of 
the document would have created a particular horizon of expectations as well as a 
degree of commensurability in its intended audience: it clearly signals that it is a 
letter from the ruler of a prosperous and powerful empire addressed to another well-
respected sovereign. This latter point would have been reconfirmed by the 
introductory remarks that describe Elizabeth I as “the select among modest Christian 
women, the pre-eminent of those honoured in the whole body of Christians, the one 
who puts to rights the affairs of the commonwealth of Christian nations, the one who 
trails the skirts of pomp and stateliness”.46 The main narrative of the letter consists of 
two sections. The first gives the reason for the campaign, eulogises the grand vizier, 
and refers to the previous year’s rout of the enemy and the capture of towns and 
castles. The second section focuses on the current year’s campaign, specifically the 
Ottoman siege of the Habsburg-held Nagykanizsa castle. It describes the number of 
enemy soldiers, and relates the battle against the Habsburg relief army, their 
subsequent flight, and the eventual surrender of the supposedly impregnable fortress.  
The grand vizierial fethname is physically smaller and less ornate. It is however, 
textually largely identical, especially the second section describing the actual capture 
of the castle. So why were two fethnames sent to Queen Elizabeth? If we understand 
the sole function of a fethname as being one of propaganda, to simply glorify the 
Ottoman Empire, to intimidate, or convey information about a victory to a recipient, 
then it makes no sense to send two fethnames. However, if we view fethnames as 
having potentially multiple functions, and if we view one of the purposes of 
diplomacy as being the process of negotiation and mediation on subjects of mutual 
concern between peoples and states, then I argue we can make sense of the dispatch 
of two Nagykanizsa fethnames and read the grand vizieral fethname as an instance of 
unofficial diplomatic correspondence. 
 
Textual Variation 
 
The various possible functions of fethnames outlined above are reflected in the 
numerous small and, at first sight, insignificant textual differences between the two 
documents. For example, following an identical salutio in both documents the 
sultanic fethname then commands “When the exalted imperial seal arrives let it be 
known that …..”.47 In contrast the grand vizierial fethname has “after prayers suitable 
to friendship and congruent with the sultanic affection it is communicated in a 
friendly manner that …..”. 48  Similarly, the sultanic fethname concludes with a 
command, “you must be fearful that, Bartholomew De Coeur, […] is forwarding our 
felicitous imperial letter and when the one skilled in medicine arrives you should 
cause this felicitous conquest, this prosperity filled conquest, to be known and 
believed by the people in your provinces and our other friends.”49 It then continues 
that the proclamation of the Ottoman victory at Nagykanizsa by the Queen to her 
subjects will be “the cause of their gladness, rejoicing, cheerfulness and 
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happiness.” 50  Such language and sentiment is an example of Ottoman imperial 
rhetoric and is typical of sultanic missives. In contrast, the grand vizierial fethname 
ends in a far more cordial manner with a reference to the enduring, long-term 
friendship between the countries and monarchs, “From the old days until this present 
moment as a consequence of your faithfulness to the threshold of the sublime [the 
Sultan’s court] whose mark is felicity, and of your well wishing [to] this region and 
your long friendliness and loving affection the events of this side, at length, have 
been communicated to the side of your noble self”.51 Overall the tone of the grand 
vizierial fethname presupposes a different relationship between the implied audience 
and author: one of greater intimacy and cordiality, which in turn alters the 
expectations of the audience. In addition, the concluding paragraph intimates the 
‘real’ reason for the communication: the Ottoman state is requesting or hoping that 
the English will continue to fight the Habsburgs, or will at least refrain from 
concluding an alliance with them. This is something I will return to below. 
The first section of the grand vizierial fethname also contains a number of textual 
variations that work to foster an atmosphere of on-going friendship and cooperation 
between the English and the Ottomans. For example, in the grand vizierial fethname, 
but not in the sultanic fethname, the English ambassador Henry Lello, is eulogised 
and described as “the model of the leaders of the Christian nation” and as a “faithful 
friend and well-wisher of all of our affairs” who “sends letters in a friendly manner 
to this region” which are “full of fidelity and loyalty” thereby foregrounding the 
cordial and personal relationship between the two countries.
52
 This ongoing, 
recursive diplomatic communication and correspondence between the English and 
the Ottomans is again signalled in the reference to English letters that “continually 
come to one from your region”.53 This example of “meta-pragmatic discourse” works 
to articulate ideologies of commensurability that envisage both states as possessing 
similar political systems, practices of governance and shared diplomatic practices.
54
 
It therefore acts as a performative process of self-validation; authorizing and 
authenticating both parties through the process of textual exchange and 
communication.  
The grand vizierial fethname also includes a reference to the unexpected Anglo-
Dutch victory over the Habsburgs at Nieuport in the Netherlands in 1600.
55
 The 
absence of a reference to this victory in the sultanic fethname can be explained in 
terms of the genre protocols associated with sultanic missives. It is not 
commensurate with a performance of sovereignty and demonstration of power to 
praise another’s victory. In contrast, I suggest that because the grand vizierial 
fethname is written within a more personal, informal, mediatorial frame, mention of 
the battle serves a number of functions. Firstly, it demonstrates Ottoman awareness 
of current English affairs and a concern with English victories, something that again 
helps to foster a propitiatory tone. More importantly, it foregrounds similarities 
between the Ottomans and the English: they both have a common enemy in the 
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Habsburgs. As the grand vizierial fethname says, "both on your side and in our 
region, honour like this has occurred. Always may our enemies not be free from 
being conquered and broken in this manner and our friends not be lacking victory 
and triumph."
56
 It also further encourages the English to continue to fight against the 
Habsburgs by requesting that “let it not cease from being that you are always 
victorious and dominant over your enemies and those who are from your opposing 
side are inverted in this manner”.57  
In contrast, in the sultanic fethname there is an oblique reference to the attempt to 
negotiate a peace treaty at Esztergom the previous year, which is absent from the 
grand vizierial fethname.
58
 Its inclusion seems designed to aid the Ottoman 
representation of themselves as a peace-loving, law and treaty-abiding state who do 
not wish to attack their Christian Habsburg neighbours, but are forced to do so 
because of the latter’s unreasonableness and aggression. A similar reference in the 
sultanic fethname to the ostensible reason behind the war - that the sultan was forced 
to “draw the sword of revenge against the vile enemy of religion” – is also absent 
from the grand vizierial fethname.
59
  Presumably both references are absent from the 
grand vizierial fethname because they are only pertinent within the discourse of 
official diplomatic protocol: in the sultanic fethname the implied author is depicting 
the Ottoman Empire as sublime and puissant, but also just and fair. References to 
Ottoman attempts to negotiate a peace and explanations of their actions in terms of 
taking revenge, rather than instigating conflict help to present such an image. In the 
grand vizierial fethname there is no need to present the campaign as fair or just. The 
implied author and audience are interacting on a different level, within a more 
collaborative and reciprocal frame. Moreover, references to attempted peace treaties 
would conflict with the key function of the document, which is to remind the English 
of the futility and inappropriateness of alliances made with the Habsburgs. 
One last subtle difference in the second part of the narrative that describes the 
actual siege of Nagykanizsa further illustrates how these two virtually identical 
documents were intended to serve distinct purposes and facilitate the creation of 
different potential meanings. Both fethnames mention the defection of ‘Frenk’ 
[Frank] soldiers from the Habsburg-held Papa garrison, their subsequent absorption 
into the Ottoman army and the role they played in the siege and capture of 
Nagykanizsa castle.
60
 The entire section concerning the capture of the castle is 
identical in both fethnames except for the second mention of the Frenk soldiers. In 
the sultanic fethname we have “the beylerbeyis [governors] of Rumeli and Bosnia 
with the Frenk soldiers who had come from Papa conquered the castle of Lak and 
Bulundvar” whereas in the grand vizierial fethname the order is reversed and it is 
“The Frenk soldiers and the beylerbeyis […]”.61 This may of course simply be a 
scribal accident, but it could also be explained in terms of the different functions of 
the two documents. The sultanic fethname is a performance of Ottoman sovereignty 
so state officials are mentioned first. The grand vizierial fethname is, in contrast, 
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focused on negotiating a closer alliance with the English. By mentioning the 
contribution of the Frenks, it clearly foregrounds not only the possibility, but also the 
desirability of Ottoman-Christian European alliances. 
 
Why Two Fethnames? 
 
There is still one question that needs to be answered: why were two fethnames sent in 
1601 when in 1596 only one fethname, in the name of the sultan, was sent to 
celebrate the capture of Eger castle?
62
 The dispatch of the grand vizierial fethname 
can be explicated, I believe, with reference to the politico-military context against 
which the two conquests occurred and the letters were sent. In 1596, the English, 
French and Dutch were all at war with the Habsburgs: a situation that benefited the 
Ottomans as it not only forestalled any chance of a potential pan-European, anti-
Ottoman crusade, but it also detracted the Spanish Habsburgs from assisting the 
Austrian Habsburgs in their war with the Ottomans. It therefore, probably did not 
seem necessary to the Ottomans to send an additional, more intercessory letter 
designed to counsel or solicit a continuation of English hostility towards the 
Habsburgs. However, by 1601 the Spanish Habsburgs had negotiated a peace treaty 
with the French (May 1598) and in 1600 had conducted, ultimately inconclusive, 
negotiations with the English.
63
 Such a shift in western European inter-state relations 
may well have begun to cause the Ottomans some concern and encouraged the 
dispatch of the grand vizierial fethname. It explains the amicable tone, and emphasis 
in the grand vizierial fethname on the longevity of the Anglo-Ottoman relationship 
and their shared successes against the Habsburgs.
64
  
This, however, begs the question as to why it was necessary to send the grand 
vizierial fethname; why could the grand vizier not just write directly to the English 
Queen and court? A later source demonstrates that there were specific protocols 
involved in inter-state correspondence that may have precluded such a course of 
action. Correspondence from the early seventeenth century between the grand vizier 
and the sultan implies that despite the Ottoman desire for information concerning the 
new King of England, James I (1603-1625) and the status of the country - 
specifically whether it had been invaded by the Spanish Habsburgs - they were 
deliberately waiting for the new English King to formally request shelter and offer 
his service to the threshold of felicity.
65
 This determination not to commence any 
new communication until the protocols of accession had been adhered to resulted in 
the Ottomans refusing to send a new ‘trade’ document to the English king and their 
dispatch of a copy of the old one previously sent to Queen Elizabeth I. The codes of 
diplomatic practice could not be violated. However, the capture of Nagykanizsa 
castle and the Ottoman diplomatic ritual of the fethname offered a potential parallel 
space for negotiation. The dispatch of the grand vizierial fethname was a means of 
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obviating the codes of official diplomatic practice and provided an ideal opportunity 
for the Ottomans to raise shared concerns and to re-confirm English opposition to the 
Habsburgs without broaching protocol.  
 
It would be easy to read the sultanic fethname as another example of arrogant, 
oriental, asymmetrical Ottoman diplomacy intended simply to intimidate and 
proclaim the might of the empire. A more nuanced approach that does not interpret 
the rituals surrounding the reception of ambassadors at the Sublime Porte described 
at the beginning of this article as a synecdoche of Ottoman diplomacy permits a 
reading of the grand vizierial fethname as an example of rational, Ottoman 
diplomatic negotiation. A textual mediation, that while it does not fit into the 
predominant model of diplomacy as performed by elite, professional ambassadors 
through formal embassies as articulated by Mattingly, is an example of 
communication between participants who shared practices of sovereignty and 
diplomacy and who recognized each other’s organizational similarities, political 
systems and conventions.
66
 One way that this commensurability was substantiated 
and sustained was through the performance of diplomatic rituals through embassies, 
ad-hoc and non-diplomatic intermediaries and a variety of textual exchanges.
67
 Such 
a reading of the fethnames therefore challenges the Eurocentric depiction by 
Hurewitz and others of the Ottomans as being disdainfully outside of western 
European diplomatic praxis until, as a response to the economic, political and 
military decline of their empire, they were reluctantly forced into the system in the 
eighteenth century. It moves away from an orientalist or Eurocentric paradigm based 
on a dichotomous opposition between Europe and the rest of the world and provides 
an insight into how the Ottomans both imagined and attempted to redraw 
relationships across confessional and political boundaries. 
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